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A Tax Analysis of the Emerging Class 
of Hybrid Entities 
INTRODUCTION 
Jeffrey Hollender was ready for a change. He had made 
a small fortune selling self-help courses, but he did not believe 
in the work anymore.1 After an embarrassing appearance on 
the Phil Donahue Show, where audience members took 
Hollender to task for the apparent moral bankruptcy of his day 
job, he began to search for a more meaningful way to spend his 
life.2 Hollender gave up his job at Warner Communications, 
took a good, long look in the mirror, and started putting 
together a book called How to Make the World a Better Place.3 
As Hollender was researching a chapter on the 
environment, he stumbled across a small catalog called Renew 
America that specialized in selling environmentally friendly 
products.4 Intrigued, he got in touch with Renew America’s 
owner, Alan Newman.5 As the two discussed the catalog, 
Hollender began to see huge potential: the environmental 
movement was really beginning to take off, but consumer 
companies were barely addressing it.6 Before long, Hollender 
convinced Newman to take him on as a partner and devoted 
himself to aggressively expanding Renew America’s business.7 
Within six years, Hollender had driven the company’s 
annual earnings from $100,000 to $6,000,000. Anticipating a 
  
 1 See Joyce Marcel, Profiles in Business: Jeffrey Hollender and Seventh Generation, 
VT. BUS. MAG. (June 1, 2003), http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-349101541.html. 
 2 See id. 
 3 See id. 
 4 See id. 
 5 See id. 
 6 See id. 
 7 See id. 
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change in the market, however, he sold the catalog and shifted 
the company’s focus to developing environmentally friendly 
products.8 At first, he cultivated relationships with natural 
foods stores.9 But before long, he was able to persuade 
traditional grocery stores to carry his products.10 As the business 
continued to grow, Hollender decided that the company’s name 
ought to reflect its commitment to sustainable products and living.11 
After one of his employees introduced him to the Great Law of the 
Iroquois Confederacy—“[i]n our every deliberation, we must 
consider the impact of our decisions on the next seven 
generations”12—Hollender renamed the company Seventh 
Generation.13 
Over the next fifteen years, Seventh Generation became 
one of the leaders of an emerging group of businesses dedicated 
to transforming consumer products.14 It also became a 
registered B Corporation, a business mark that designates a 
company’s commitment to social and environmental 
standards.15 It is difficult to overstate the company’s impact on 
the widespread availability of environmentally friendly 
cleaning products. Seventh Generation was one of the earliest 
environmentally focused companies to push its products into 
ordinary supermarkets.16 By doing so, the company helped 
move sustainable brands beyond a niche and into the 
mainstream—turning a nascent market in environmentally 
responsible goods into a profitable alternative to traditional 
products.17 Seventh Generation’s cleaning products have also 
had a major influence on its competitors. In 2010, Seventh 
Generation finally persuaded the American Cleaning 
Institute’s members to implement a voluntary ban on the use of 
damaging phosphates in dishwater detergent—a major shift in 
industry practice that water protectionists are lauding as an 
  
 8 See id. 
 9 See id. 
 10 See id. 
 11 See id. 
 12 Great Law of the Iroquois Confederacy, FAST COMPANY (Apr. 15, 2004), 
http://www.fastcompany.com/blog/fast-company-staff/fast-company-blog/great-law-
iroquois-confederacy. 
 13 Marcel, supra note 1. 
 14 Id. 
 15 B Corporation—Wave of the Future for Business, SEVENTH GENERATION, 
http://www.seventhgeneration.com/learn/blog/b-corporation-wave-future-business (last 
visited Oct. 12, 2012). See infra Part III.B for a detailed explanation of B Corporations. 
 16 Marcel, supra note 1. 
 17 Id. 
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important step forward for the cleaning products industry.18 
The company’s product line is also chlorine free, and the 
strength of its sales has, in part, prompted traditional 
competitors to begin offering their own chlorine-free products.19 
Human-health and environmental-safety experts recognize this 
movement away from chlorine as a substantial market 
improvement.20 
Despite helping to develop the market for 
environmentally responsible cleaning products, leading its 
competitors to improve the environmental quality of their 
product lines, and making important contributions to the water-
safety movement, Seventh Generation has never been eligible for 
favorable federal tax incentives.21 As far as the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) is concerned, Seventh Generation is no different 
from Tide, Cascade, or Clorox.22  
This note considers whether the federal tax scheme for 
companies like Seventh Generation is appropriate given the 
benefits they appear to confer on society—an issue that is 
increasingly more salient as an emerging business sector 
known as “social enterprise”23 tests and pushes traditional 
business boundaries. Social enterprise is characterized by 
businesses that pursue a dual mission of achieving “social and 
business goals together, viewing them as synergistic and 
mutually reinforcing, as equal partners in their business 
vision.”24 Hemmed in by traditional business entities like for-
profit and nonprofit corporations, social entrepreneurs have 
recently developed a handful of new business entities that 
attempt to achieve at least three central goals: (1) articulate 
and pursue a dual mission, (2) gain access to capital, and (3) 
effectively brand dual-mission businesses.25 The hybrid entities 
that are most commonly in use today are: the Low-Profit 
Limited Liability Company (L3C), which is a socially oriented 
  
 18 Detergent Industry’s Landmark Voluntary Phosphate Ban Caps Seventh 
Generation’s Decade-Long Fight, MARKETWIRE (June 29, 2010), http://www.marketwire.com/ 
press-release/detergent-industrys-landmark-voluntary-phosphate-ban-caps-seventh-
generations-decade-1283540.htm. 
 19 See, e.g., CLOROX, http://www.clorox.com/products (last visited Oct. 11, 2012).  
 20 Medical Hazards of Chlorine, CHLORINE FREE PRODUCTS ASS’N, 
http://chlorinefreeproducts.org/medicalhazardsofchlorine.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2012). 
 21 See infra Part III.  
 22 See infra Part III. 
 23 Dana Brakman Reiser, For-Profit Philanthropy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 
2450 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 24 Id. 
 25 See Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form of 
Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 610 (2011). 
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variant of the traditional limited liability company that state 
statutes enable companies to adopt; the Benefit Corporation (B 
Corporation), which is a private designation offered by the 
nonprofit organization B Lab to third-party organizations that 
meet a set of qualifying criteria; and the statutory benefit 
corporation, which is an alternative to the traditional for-profit 
corporation that state statutes allow qualifying corporations to 
adopt.26 While there is a healthy debate concerning whether 
these three entities serve the core social enterprise goals, there 
has been comparatively little scholarship concerning how they 
should be taxed. This note helps to develop that discussion by 
considering to what extent these so-called hybrid entities 
qualify for favorable federal tax treatment under two 
traditional theories for nonprofit tax advantages and also 
under Professors Malani and Posner’s broader theory of 
favorable taxation for socially beneficial activities.27 These 
theories provide a helpful springboard for this conversation 
because the core hybrid-entity goal of pursuing social good 
stands in rough parallel to the socially beneficial objectives of 
traditional nonprofits. 
This note argues that while each of the three most 
common American hybrid entities demonstrates some 
characteristics that justify favorable tax treatment, they also 
lack essential structural features that would warrant entity-
based tax advantages. Part I offers a backdrop for the hybrid 
entity’s development by introducing social enterprise and 
briefly reviewing the corporation, the nonprofit corporation, 
and the key challenges these forms present for businesses 
interested in pursuing both public good and profit. Part II 
explains how for-profit and nonprofit corporations are normally 
taxed, introduces two traditional rationales for nonprofit tax 
benefits, and describes Malani and Posner’s critique of the 
current tax regime. Part III then presents the three hybrid 
entities discussed above and considers to what extent they 
address the core considerations of the traditional tax rationales 
and Malani and Posner’s theory. This analysis highlights the 
elements of each hybrid entity that support favorable tax 
treatment. It also discusses those features that preclude or 
impede federal tax advantages.  
  
 26 See infra Part III. 
 27 Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L. 
REV. 2017, 2022 (2007). 
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I.  SOCIAL ENTERPRISE AND CURRENT ENTITY FORMS  
A. Social Enterprise 
The social enterprise movement has developed over the 
past two to three decades28 as entrepreneurs have created 
businesses that use “earned income strategies” to “directly 
address[] social need[s] . . . through [their] products and 
services.”29 As such, the “social enterprise ideal”30 typically 
involves blending traditional business methods31 with a “deep 
and particular commitment to philanthropic endeavor.”32 
Achieving this ideal requires the pursuit of the so-called double 
bottom line, which contemplates both financial and social 
success.33 Social enterprise has taken many shapes but 
commonly fits within one of two models: (1) a profit-driven 
entity that incorporates socially responsible business choices in 
some elements of its decision making (a model that bears a 
good deal of similarity to corporate social responsibility), or (2) 
a social-value-driven entity that contemplates earning some 
profits in its business activities.34 
The theoretical underpinnings of social enterprise are, 
at turns, intuitively appealing to the socially minded or 
practically unsatisfying to the business traditionalist. But 
whether one is a devotee or an agnostic about the wisdom, 
value, and utility of social enterprise, its proponents have 
identified characteristics of traditional business forms that 
present something of a conundrum for social enterprise.35 As 
such, social entrepreneurs and legal theorists have advocated 
the development of new hybrid entities designed to obviate 
these challenges and serve the dual-mission approach of social 
enterprise.36 Before turning to the new entities, however, it is 
  
 28 See Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on the Social Enterprise 
Frontier, 84 TUL. L. REV. 337, 342 (2009). 
 29 What is Social Enterprise, SOC. ENTERPRISE ALLIANCE, https://www.se-
alliance.org/what-is-social-enterprise (last visited Oct. 11, 2012). 
 30 Brakman Reiser, supra note 23, at 2450. 
 31 SOCIAL ENTERPRISE ALLIANCE, supra note 29. 
 32 Brakman Reiser, supra note 23, at 2450. 
 33 Kelley, supra note 28, at 339. 
 34 See id. at 351-52. 
 35 See id. at 363. 
 36 Id. at 340 (“According to [the proponents of social enterprise], we are in the 
process of moving beyond the traditional conception of society as divided neatly into 
three sectors—business, nonprofit, and government—and are witnessing the 
emergence of a new fourth sector that encompasses elements of both the business and 
nonprofit sectors.”). 
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instructive to consider the traditional entity landscape from 
which they emerge. 
B. The For-Profit Corporation 
Given the current debate concerning whether new 
hybrid entities are necessary to facilitate social enterprise, it is 
interesting to note that the earliest corporations were not 
organized for commercial activities.37 Instead, they were 
incorporated for a variety of municipal, community, and 
charitable purposes.38 Soon, however, the corporation became 
the entity of choice for commercial business in America.39 As 
market “demand grew for a form of business organization that 
could amass and efficiently manage very large and longlived 
capital investments,”40 legislators responded by gradually 
endowing the corporation with three central components that 
enabled it to serve this demand: (1) “the right to issue 
transferable shares,” (2) delegation of shareholder power to 
management, and (3) limited liability for shareholders.41 With 
these features commonly in place, the corporation was able to 
serve as the mechanism for capital growth and investment that 
American business demanded.42  
As the corporate form developed, so too did the theory of 
shareholder primacy,43 which many social entrepreneurs and 
legal theorists consider the largest obstacle to the dual mission 
of social enterprise.44 Shareholder primacy theory stands for the 
principle that the corporation’s primary fiduciary responsibility 
is to maximize the value of the corporation for its 
shareholders.45 “If pursuit of this objective conflicts with the 
interests of one or more of the corporation’s nonshareholder 
constituencies, management is to disregard such competing 
  
 37 MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 40 (2004). 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 William L. Baldwin, The Corporation and Society: An Evolutionary/Institutional 
Approach, 27 VT. L. REV. 841, 843-44 (2003). 
 41 Id. at 844. 
 42 See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 37, at 150. 
 43 D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 296 
(1998) (“[T]he shareholder primacy norm was not developed by courts until the 1830s, 
but evidence of shareholder primacy is abundant in early business corporations. Early 
corporate charters, general incorporation statutes, judicial decisions, and legal 
commentary all reflect a commitment to shareholder primacy in the similar treatment 
of dividends and voting rules.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 44 Kelley, supra note 28, at 351-52. 
 45 Smith, supra note 43, at 282. 
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considerations.”46 This belief was articulated, perhaps most 
famously, in the all-too-familiar case of Dodge v. Ford Motor 
Co., where the Supreme Court of Michigan found that “[a] 
business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for 
the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to 
be employed for that end.”47 As stated in Dodge, the theory of 
shareholder primacy became a legal hurdle for corporations 
that sought to engage in activities expressly for the public good 
rather than for shareholder value.48 
In response to criticisms of the shareholder primacy 
theory,49 many states have adopted a so-called constituency 
statute, which “authorizes, but does not require, the board to 
take into account the interests of stakeholders such as 
employees, suppliers, the community, the environment, and 
shareholders when determining a course of action or making a 
decision.”50 Delaware, where most Fortune 500 corporations are 
currently incorporated, does not have such a constituency 
statute.51 But it does expressly authorize corporations to 
“[m]ake donations for the public welfare or for charitable, 
scientific or educational purposes, and in time of war or other 
national emergency in aid thereof.”52 It is unclear, however, to 
what extent these statutory provisions can facilitate the dual 
missions of social enterprise. To consider this question, it is 
  
 46 Id. 
 47 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). 
 48 See generally Anthony Bisconti, Note, The Double Bottom Line: Can 
Constituency Statutes Protect Socially Responsible Corporations Stuck in Revlon Land?, 
42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 765 (2009). It is worth pointing out that the court’s statement on 
shareholder primacy in Dodge was dicta. Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching 
Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163, 167 (2008). Moreover, Professor Stout argues 
that the case can be read more profitably as holding that Henry Ford, as a controlling 
shareholder, had breached his fiduciary duty of good faith to minority shareholders. See 
id. While Dodge may not properly be read to articulate the theory of shareholder primacy, 
it is the theory’s apocryphal root and, as its facts “are familiar to virtually every student 
who has taken a course in corporate law,” id. at 164, it is a helpful heuristic.  
 49 Shareholder primacy theory actually developed into one of the more 
contentious debates in corporate law’s history. Ian B. Lee, Efficiency and Ethics in the 
Debate About Shareholder Primacy, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 533, 535 (2006). Since early debate 
on the topic in the pages of the Harvard Law Review between Professors Berle and Dodd, 
scholarship has continually questioned to what degree a corporation’s concerns should be 
fixed to maximize shareholder value. See Smith, supra note 43, at 281-82; see also Marshall 
M. Magaro, Two Birds, One Stone: Achieving Corporate Social Responsibility Through the 
Shareholder-Primacy Norm, 85 IND. L.J. 1149, 1152-53 (2010). 
 50 Rakhi I. Patel, Facilitating Stakeholder-Interest Maximization: 
Accommodating Beneficial Corporations in the Model Business Corporation Act, 23 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 135, 146 (2010). 
 51 See id. at 147. 
 52 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122 (2011). 
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useful to assess the range of activities that constituency 
statutes have enabled.  
C. Corporate Social Responsibility 
The prevalence of constituency statutes and similar 
statutory provisions authorizing corporate donations has paved 
the way for corporations to engage in at least some amount of 
philanthropic activity.53 Corporate social responsibility, as this 
activity has come to be known,54 is now exceedingly commonplace 
and typically takes one of two forms.55 First, corporations use 
corporate funds to make charitable contributions.56 These 
donations reached a total of $15.29 million in 2010, a full 5 
percent of charitable giving in the United States.57 Along the same 
lines, corporations often elect to make in-kind contributions of 
property or services.58 Corporations choose to make such 
donations for several reasons, including to develop a corporate 
image and identity of care and giving, to associate a corporate 
brand with quality gift recipients, and to improve or influence the 
communities where the corporation has a presence.59  
Second, companies may “bring consideration of social 
impact into the mainstream of their business operations” and 
make significant strategic and tactical decisions based in part 
upon their impact on social, community, environmental, and 
other factors related to the public good.60 Starbucks’s decision to 
support rural coffee farmers around the world by committing to 
purchase fair trade coffee is one example of this form of 
corporate social responsibility.61 These types of supply-chain 
decisions may not directly improve the net asset value of a 
corporation’s shares (although they could), but they are viewed 
  
 53 See generally Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Is Social Enterprise the New 
Corporate Social Responsibility?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1351 (2011). 
 54 See id.  
 55 Brakman Reiser, supra note 23, at 2446. 
 56 Id. 
 57 GIVING USA, THE ANNUAL REPORT ON PHILANTHROPY FOR THE YEAR 2010: 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 (2011).  
 58 See Brakman Reiser, supra note 23, at 2447 (“Nor has corporate generosity 
been limited to cash donations; an estimated one-third to one-half of corporate giving 
takes the form of in-kind contributions.”). 
 59 Id.; see also Henry N. Butler & Fred S. McChesney, Why They Give at the 
Office: Shareholder Welfare and Corporate Philanthropy in the Contractual Theory of 
the Corporation, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1195, 1202-03 (1999). 
 60 Brakman Reiser, supra note 23, at 2449. 
 61 Being a Responsible Company, STARBUCKS, http://www.starbucks.com/ 
responsibility (last visited Sept. 30, 2011).  
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as a way for powerful and influential corporations to 
“spearhead solutions to society’s greatest problems.”62 
Corporate social responsibility has traditionally 
provided the mechanism by which profit-driven corporations 
can engage in philanthropic activities. But notwithstanding the 
threat of direct legal challenges that attend corporate decisions 
made for reasons other than maximization of shareholder 
profits, even comparatively uncontested corporate philanthropy 
has its limits.63 First, the discretion to engage in high levels of 
philanthropic activity is “powerfully limited by managerial 
profit-sharing or stock options, product market competition, the 
labor market for corporate officials, the need to raise capital, 
the threat of takeovers, and the prospect of being ousted by 
shareholder vote.”64 Second, legal limits constrain corporate 
philanthropy. For instance, the American Law Institute (ALI) 
states that “managers can devote only a ‘reasonable’ amount of 
corporate resources to public interest purposes, and can consider 
ethical principles only to the extent they are ‘reasonably 
regarded as appropriate to the responsible conduct of 
business.’”65 The ALI recommends looking to two factors to 
determine reasonableness: (1) decisions “by similar corporations, 
and (2) the nexus between the public-spirited activity and the 
corporation’s business.”66 Similarly, decisions made pursuant to 
state statutes authorizing corporate philanthropic activity 
generally permit only reasonable donations.67 As a result of these 
constraints, corporate social responsibility is not a perfect 
solution for social-enterprise businesses that wish to 
aggressively pursue both social good and profits.  
D. The Nonprofit Corporation 
The nonprofit corporation, like the corporation, can also 
trace its lineage back to ancient times, when most major 
religions encouraged communities to care for their less 
fortunate and provide for one another in times of need.68 This 
commitment to charitable community action through association 
  
 62 Brakman Reiser, supra note 23, at 2452. 
 63 See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public 
Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 842 (2005). 
 64 See id. at 840. 
 65 Id. at 842-43 (citation omitted).  
 66 Id. at 843 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 67 See id. at 843 n.222 (collecting cases). 
 68 Thomas Kelley, Rediscovering Vulgar Charity: A Historical Analysis of 
America’s Tangled Nonprofit Law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2440-41 (2005). 
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evolved into a practicing tradition in America and England, 
where governments created organizational forms to serve 
charitable activity during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries.69 Interestingly, in an early foreshadowing of today’s 
entity debate, businesses serving the public good disagreed 
about the best entity to serve their needs.70 Originally, the more 
common vehicle for charitable activity was the charitable trust.71 
But as the charitable trust came under a cloud of skepticism,72 
which was one reason among many that the corporation became 
the dominant organizational form for charitable and other 
philanthropic purposes by the twentieth century.73 
Although organizational forms such as the trust are 
available for nonprofits, the corporation remains the favored 
entity for organizations that are dedicated to serving some 
form of public good.74 “[T]he most significant category” of these 
corporations “is found at [Internal Revenue] Code section 
501(c)(3).”75 While these nonprofit corporations must comply 
with a range of statutory requirements, two stand out as most 
relevant for this discussion. First, nonprofit organizations 
“must be both organized and operated exclusively for one or 
more” specified purposes, which include religious, charitable, 
scientific, testing for public safety, literary, educational, and 
prevention of cruelty to children or animals.76 Second, nonprofits 
operate under what Professor Hansmann calls the 
nondistribution constraint,77 whereby a nonprofit corporation “is 
  
 69 Id. at 2451-58. 
 70 Id. 
 71 James J. Fishman, The Development of Nonprofit Corporation Law and an 
Agenda for Reform, 34 EMORY L.J. 617, 625 (1985). 
 72 Id. at 628 (“For much of the nineteenth century the use of the charitable 
trust suffered from widespread fear of the dead hand, particularly the dead hand of the 
church, from strict construction of trust statutes, and from judicial unwillingness to 
recognize the charitable trust.” (footnote omitted)). 
 73 Id. at 629-37. 
 74 “Most nonprofits of any significance are incorporated.” Henry B. 
Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1980). While 
“[f]ederal tax exemption law is agnostic among the organizational forms qualifying 
charities might take,” Dana Brakman Reiser, Charity Law’s Essentials, 86 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1, 17 (2011), this note agrees with Hansmann’s position that the 
corporation is the most significant corporate entity. Consequently, this note does not 
discuss the other nonprofit forms at any length.  
 75 I. Richard Gershon, Tax-Exempt Entities: Achieving and Maintaining 
Special Status Under the Watchful Eye of the Internal Revenue Service, 16 CUMB. L. 
REV. 301, 303 (1986).  
 76 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)-(g) (2011). 
 77 Hansmann, supra note 74, at 838 (“Since a good deal of the discussion that 
follows will focus upon this prohibition on the distribution of profits, it will be helpful 
to have a term for it; I shall call it the ‘nondistribution constraint.’”). This requirement 
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barred from distributing its net earnings, if any, to individuals 
who exercise control over it, such as members, officers, directors, 
or trustees.”78 Generally speaking, these requirements are in 
place to ensure that nonprofits are organized to deliver public 
(rather than private) benefits and to enforce a nonprofit’s 
ongoing commitment to this mission. While the purpose 
requirement may not present a problem for social enterprise, 
the nondistribution constraint presents a more serious 
challenge. As Malani and Posner note, any social enterprise that 
prefers a compensation scheme that permits distribution of 
profits or equity, rather than a purely salary-based 
compensation model, will not organize as a nonprofit.79 
E. The Development of Hybrid Entities 
Given these characteristics of for-profit and nonprofit 
corporations, social entrepreneurs became increasingly frustrated 
with their entity options. If a social-enterprise business were 
organized as a corporation, the shareholder primacy theory could 
always threaten its publicly oriented activities.80 On the other 
hand, if it were organized as a nonprofit corporation, the 
nondistribution constraint would deny owners any share of the 
business’s earnings, and it could only pursue an exempt purpose.81 
As a result, social entrepreneurs attempted to carve a middle path 
between the crossroads of for-profit and nonprofit corporations. 
Proposed entity forms have not been in short supply. To 
date, legal scholars, social business leaders, and legislatures 
have offered a spate of potential solutions that purport to make 
social enterprise a more attractive business model, to 
reconsider the bright-line division between for-profit and 
nonprofit businesses, or both.82 In the United States, the most 
notable of these entities are the L3C, the B Corporation, and 
the statutory benefit corporation.83 While these forms differ in 
  
is embedded within the operation test established in the regulations. 26 C.F.R. 
§ 1.501(c)(3)-1. 
 78 Hansmann, supra note 74, at 838; see also 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1. 
 79 Malani & Posner, supra note 27, at 2019. 
 80 See generally Bisconti, supra note 48.  
 81 Hansmann, supra note 74, at 838; see also 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1. 
 82 See, e.g., Dana Brakman Reiser, Blended Enterprise and the Dual Mission 
Dilemma, 35 VT. L. REV. 105, 105 (2010); see also Malani & Posner, supra note 27, at 2060.  
 83 See Part III infra for a detailed discussion on the characteristics of each 
entity. For further discussion of these three entities, see Brakman Reiser, supra note 
82, at 108-16. Brakman Reiser also notes that the United Kingdom has added the 
community interest corporation, which was developed exclusively for the purpose of 
serving its growing community of social entrepreneurs. Id. However, as this note 
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significant respects84 and their relative virtues are hotly 
debated in legal circles,85 each attempts, in its own way, to 
create an entity that can: (1) articulate and pursue a dual 
mission, (2) gain access to capital, and (3) effectively brand 
dual-mission businesses.86  
Because these hybrid entities integrate elements of both 
for-profit corporations and nonprofit corporations, a question 
lingers: should the entities qualify for favorable tax treatment? 
The next section begins to address this question by describing 
the basic elements of for-profit and nonprofit corporate taxation, 
introducing two traditional theories for the distinction between 
taxation of for-profit and nonprofit corporations, as well as 
Malani and Posner’s recent critique of this distinction. 
II. TAXATION OF FOR-PROFITS AND NONPROFITS 
A. Taxation of the For-Profit Corporation 
Generally speaking, the federal government imposes an 
annual tax on corporations.87 With several exceptions, corporate 
income is taxed like individual income.88 Thus, under section 63 
of the Internal Revenue Code, corporations are taxed on their 
taxable income, which includes “gross income minus the 
deductions allowed by this chapter.”89 Corporations, like 
individuals, calculate gross income by including “all income from 
whatever source derived.”90 Corporations may then claim 
  
focuses on American tax considerations, it will not provide an analysis of the 
community interest corporation. 
 84 See infra Part III. 
 85 See generally Brakman Reiser, supra note 82. 
 86 Brakman Reiser, supra note 25, at 610.  
 87 I.R.C. § 11 (2006). S Corporations are a key exception to this general rule. 
BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS 
AND SHAREHOLDERS ¶ 6.01 (7th ed. 2012). Congress created the S Corporation in order 
to “eliminate the influence of the Federal income tax in the selection of the form of 
business organization which may be most desirable under the circumstances.” Id. In an 
S Corporation, which is subject to certain eligibility requirements, the corporation is 
not taxed on its income; rather, the shareholders are taxed personally on the corporate 
income even where it is not distributed. Id. Traditional corporate taxation and the S 
Corporation exception illustrate a central tension behind corporate tax policy. On the 
one hand, the federal government wants to raise revenue by imposing a traditional tax 
on corporate activity that produces income. On the other hand, the government is 
mindful that the tax system may err when tax consequences distort optimal decision-
making. This same tension is evident throughout the discussion concerning how to tax 
hybrid entities. 
 88 BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 87, ¶ 1.01. 
 89 I.R.C. § 63. 
 90 Id. § 61. 
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deductions for “most of the items that are taxable to or 
deductible by individuals,”91 as well as a number of special 
deductions that apply specifically to corporations.92 This taxable 
income is then subject to a progressive tax rate with current 
top marginal rates of 34-39%.93 
B. Taxation of the Nonprofit Corporation 
Nonprofit corporations, by contrast, are exempt from 
federal income tax.94 The IRS extends this tax privilege as long 
as the corporation meets the requirements for nonprofit 
status.95 Nonprofit corporations also receive significant benefits 
from section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code, which allows 
taxpayers to claim a deduction for contributions made to these 
businesses.96 But this favorable tax treatment is not without 
limits.97 Perhaps most significantly, nonprofit business activities 
are subject to the “unrelated business income tax” (UBIT).98 The 
UBIT is imposed on “any trade or business” activity that is not 
substantially related to the nonprofit’s exempt purposes.99 The 
IRS imposes this tax to prevent nonprofits from gaining an 
unfair competitive advantage over for-profit businesses by 
using tax-exempt income to generate additional earnings in 
activities not directly tied to their exempt purposes.100 This 
limitation notwithstanding, however, the exemption from 
federal tax can provide significant benefits for corporations 
that organize as nonprofits.  
  
 91 BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 87, ¶ 1.01. 
 92 I.R.C. §§ 241-249. 
 93 BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 87, ¶ 1.01. 
 94 I.R.C. § 501(a). 
 95 See supra Part I.D; see also I.R.C. § 501. 
 96 I.R.C. § 170; see also Malani & Posner, supra note 27, at 2026. 
 97 Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the Charity 
Tax Exemption, 23 J. CORP. L. 585, 586 (1998). 
 98 I.R.C. § 513. The IRS also imposes the unrelated debt-financed income tax, 
which applies to any property that is not substantially related to the nonprofit’s 
exempt purposes and is subject to debt when the nonprofit acquires it. Id. § 514. 
 99 Id. § 513.  
 100 26 C.F.R. § 1.513-1 (2012) (“The primary objective of adoption of the 
unrelated business income tax was to eliminate a source of unfair competition by 
placing the unrelated business activities of certain exempt organizations upon the 
same tax basis as the nonexempt business endeavors with which they compete.”); see 
also Daniel Halperin, Is Income Tax Exemption for Charities A Subsidy?, 64 TAX L. 
REV. 283, 299-300 (2011).  
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C. Traditional Rationales for the Distinction  
Two common rationales explain why the government 
provides distinct tax treatment for nonprofit and for-profit 
businesses. The first rationale emerges out of the underlying 
principle that the income tax should apply to earnings and be 
measured in part by a taxpayer’s ability to pay the tax.101 These 
objectives are somewhat difficult to apply to nonprofit 
organizations, particularly since these organizations do not 
seek profit to the extent that traditional for-profit businesses 
do.102 Furthermore, nonprofits have traditionally distributed 
most or all of their earnings to beneficiaries through direct 
public services or grantmaking, which significantly diminishes 
their ability to pay taxes. Thus, taxing nonprofits may simply 
be incompatible with major underlying goals of our tax system. 
This first principle has animated the tax distinction 
between for-profits and nonprofits since the earliest federal tax 
bills.103 For instance, the Revenue Act of 1894, one of the 
earliest pieces of income-tax legislation, imposed a limited 
income tax on traditional profit-driven corporations, while 
creating exemptions for “various charitable, religious, 
educational, and fraternal benefit organizations.”104 Congressional 
debate of the bill suggests that these exemptions were probably 
included to prevent taxation of businesses that were not 
organized to pursue profits.105 While this bill was later 
overturned for constitutional reasons,106 Congress revisited the 
topic in the Revenue Act of 1913—the first tax legislation 
  
 101 See generally Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of 
Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299 (1976). While 
this note applies Bittker and Rahdert’s theory as articulated, it is important to 
acknowledge that others have criticized their view as overly narrow. See, e.g., Barbara 
K. Bucholtz, Reflections on the Role of Nonprofit Associations in a Representative 
Democracy, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 555, 566-67 (1998) (“[A]s Henry Hansmann 
noted, the Bittker and Rahdert thesis failed to encompass the entire universe of 
nonprofits. He argued that their thesis omitted nonprofits that derive a substantial 
portion of their income not from donations but from goods and services they provide. 
Income to these nonprofits is indistinguishable from income derived from proprietary 
enterprises in the private sector.” (footnotes omitted)).  
 102 FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 37, at 152. 
 103 See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 101, at 301. 
 104 See id. at 302. Two earlier federal income tax laws were passed to support 
the Civil War but expired without renewal shortly thereafter. Stephanie Hunter 
McMahon, A Law with A Life of Its Own: The Development of the Federal Income Tax 
Statutes Through World War I, 7 PITT. TAX REV. 1, 8-17 (2009).  
 105 See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 101, at 303 (citation omitted). 
 106 Hunter McMahon, supra note 104, at 26-27. 
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initiated after passage of the Sixteenth Amendment.107 As 
Congress explored and defined the parameters of its new 
taxing power, it continued to treat for-profit and nonprofit 
organizations differently by imposing an income tax on for-
profit corporations while exempting nonprofits.108 As the bill’s 
author stated during debate, “this bill contains the usual 
language exempting all corporations of the different kinds 
mentioned . . . . Of course any kind of society or corporation that 
is not doing business for profit and not acquiring profit would 
not come within the meaning of the [applicable] taxing clause.”109 
This first rationale continues to exercise intuitive appeal. 
The second rationale for the nonprofit income-tax 
exemption is the public goods theory, which asserts that these 
organizations provide services that the government would 
otherwise perform.110 Thus, “the government is compensated for 
the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burden which 
would otherwise have to be met by appropriations from public 
funds, and by the benefits resulting from the promotion of the 
general welfare.”111 Moreover, nonprofits may provide these 
socially desirable activities more efficiently than the 
government, given that they may be able to respond more 
quickly and effectively to needs in the population that they 
serve.112 The potential efficiencies of nonprofits provide another 
rationale for the government to facilitate nonprofit business 
activity by reducing their tax liability. 
Some argue that these rationales provide coherent 
reasons for the nonprofit tax exemption, while others believe 
they result in an unwarranted subsidy to a sizable class of 
businesses.113 In either case, it is difficult to ignore that a 
  
 107 Passage of the Sixteenth Amendment enabled Congress to pass 
comprehensive income tax laws in 1913 and set the tone for the nation’s ongoing tax 
system. Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 101, at 303. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. (quoting 50 CONG. REC. 1306 (1913)). 
 110 Gershon, supra note 75, at 324. There is also a broader view of the public 
goods theory, which includes benefits beyond those that the government would 
otherwise perform, including “the social norms of trust, cooperation, and reciprocity 
that develop through positive citizen interaction and which undergirds the effective 
functioning of democracy and a market economy.” Barbara K. Bucholtz, Doing Well by 
Doing Good and Vice Versa: Self-Sustaining NGO/Nonprofit Organizations, 17 J.L. & POL’Y 
403, 442 n.137 (2009) (quoting Janelle A. Kerlin, Social Enterprise in the United States and 
Europe: Understanding and Learning from the Differences, 17 VOLUNTAS: INT’L J. 
VOLUNTARY & NONPROFIT ORGS. 247, 258 n.6 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 111 Gershon, supra note 75, at 323-24 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 
3d Sess. 1939-1 (Part II) C.B. 742). 
 112 Id. at 324. 
 113 See Halperin, supra note 100, at 299-300. 
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primary effect of the distinction is to reinforce the formalistic 
division between for-profits and nonprofits. The IRS and 
Congress are intent on ensuring, on the one hand, that 
nonprofit tax benefits do not privilege for-profits and, on the 
other hand, that nonprofits do not use their tax benefits to 
compete with traditional profit-making businesses. So although 
social-enterprise businesses may successfully blend nonprofit 
and for-profit goals, they must either forego the tax advantages 
of the nonprofit or lose the business privileges of the for-profit. 
This approach has been subjected to recent criticism that 
advocates pushing beyond this binary tax distinction. 
D. Critique of the Current Tax Distinction 
Two of the most prominent critics of the current 
statutory scheme, Professors Malani and Posner, argue that 
the tax code should instead provide tax incentives and 
privileges to businesses engaged in activities that promote the 
public good, regardless of whether they organize as a nonprofit 
business.114 Malani and Posner’s argument advances on four 
points. First, they assume that the public goods theory115 is 
correct and that the government should provide favorable tax 
treatment for activities that eliminate the need for government 
action by providing publicly beneficial goods or services.116 But 
they reason that this theory supports tax advantages for any 
business that provides these services and cannot logically be 
restricted to businesses that organize as nonprofits.117 Second, 
they argue that the risk of principal–agent costs118 is not 
necessarily eliminated by the nonprofit form. Specifically, an 
altruistic business manager (the agent) at a publicly oriented 
for-profit business may not take advantage of the opportunity 
  
 114 See Malani & Posner, supra note 27, at 2064-65. 
 115 See supra Part III.C. 
 116 Malani & Posner, supra note 27, at 2030. 
 117 Id. at 2031. 
 118 Professor Evelyn Brody concisely explains the nature and consequences of 
agency costs:  
Agency costs are the heart of the maxim: “If you want something done right, you 
have to do it yourself.” To an economist, agency costs arise because the agent 
simply does not have the same incentives as the principal. Agency costs include, 
among other things, the principal’s costs of monitoring the agent (against 
misunderstanding, shirking, and even theft), and the agent’s cost of bonding 
(such as accepting low initial wages to back up the promised performance).  
Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the Nonprofit 
and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457, 462-63 (1996). 
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to produce a lower-quality product for his constituents (the 
principal); conversely, a business manager at a nonprofit may 
reduce product quality to guard against “risk of job loss or to 
increase her leisure.”119 Third, they assert that even if tax 
breaks for nonprofits encourage reduce the cost of public goods 
for downstream public beneficiaries, an exclusive nonprofit 
incentive may “crowd out for-profits that produce the 
charitable good more cheaply than the nonprofits.”120 As a result, 
they argue that the government should use favorable tax 
treatment to reward businesses that use for-profit business 
structures to provide publicly beneficial goods and service with 
improved efficiency. Finally, they posit that even if providing tax 
incentives exclusively to nonprofits may protect imperfect 
consumers from unscrupulous businesses that distribute 
donations improperly,121 fraud laws already offer this protection.122  
Malani and Posner’s entity-neutral theory of federal tax 
incentives anticipated the rise of social enterprise. At the time 
that Malani and Posner developed their theory, hybrid entities 
did not exist. Now that the L3C, Benefit Corporation, and 
statutory benefit corporation are used more expansively than 
ever before, Malani and Posner’s theory can be put to new use. 
By applying their analysis to the new classes of hybrid entities, 
we can develop a deeper understanding of whether and to what 
extent the entities deserve federal tax benefits. 
  
 119 Malani & Posner, supra note 27, at 2035. 
 120 Id. at 2045-46. Some scholars have criticized Malani and Posner’s vision of 
efficiency as being rather stylized: “Instead of relying on empirical evidence, therefore, 
Malani and Posner theorize that for-profits are more efficient than nonprofits because 
of intrinsic differences in their compensation schemes.” James R. Hines, Jr. et al., The 
Attack on Nonprofit Status: A Charitable Assessment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1179, 1193 
(2010). Professor Hines notes: “Knowing whether nonprofits are less efficient than for-
profits requires evaluating comparable nonprofits and for-profits—those that, among 
other things, have the same goals and produce the same goods. Finding comparable 
institutions is a notoriously difficult exercise.” Id. While there is value in this critique 
of Malani and Posner’s theory, the purpose of this note is to apply Malani and Posner’s 
articulation of efficiency to the hybrid entities, withholding any criticism of that theory 
for another day. 
 121 Some theorists argue that the charitable tax exemption is provided 
exclusively to nonprofits as “a way to protect the government from imperfect donors.” 
Malani & Posner, supra note 27, at 2050-51. That is, would-be donors to socially 
minded businesses who are “insensitive to administrative costs,” including an 
organization’s distribution of profits to owners, might make donations to organizations 
that shirk on the quality of goods in order to retain more earnings for their owners. Id. 
By restricting the charitable deduction to the nonprofit form, the government prevents 
donors from making a choice that could produce this inefficient result. Id. 
 122 Id. at 2051. 
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III. APPLYING THE TAX THEORIES TO HYBRID ENTITIES 
This note now proceeds to consider how the traditional 
theories of nonprofit tax exemption and Malani and Posner’s 
broader theory of tax advantages for socially beneficial 
activities apply to the hybrid entities. This analysis proceeds in 
three stages. First, the note introduces the hybrid entities and 
their statutory or structural characteristics relevant to tax 
treatment. Second, the analysis applies the traditional theories 
to the hybrid entities and determines how extensively the 
entities address the policy rationales that generally support 
favorable tax treatment. Third, the note applies Malani and 
Posner’s theory to the hybrid entities. This portion of the 
analysis begins by addressing whether and to what extent the 
hybrid entities deliver a public good that eliminates the need 
for a government service. It then considers whether and to 
what extent the hybrid entities create principal–agent 
problems. This section focuses primarily on the enforcement 
and regulatory regimes that hybrid entities have adopted to 
protect against this issue. It then considers whether these 
hybrid entities may be able to provide public goods and services 
more efficiently than a traditional nonprofit.123 
Through this analysis, the note identifies the statutory 
and structural provisions of the new hybrid entities that 
support favorable tax treatment. It also discusses the elements 
that militate against entity-based tax advantages. Ultimately, 
the note concludes that each hybrid entity lacks essential 
features that would help justify federal tax benefits. 
Nevertheless, the analysis provides a launching point for 
hybrid-entity boosters and legislatures who may wish to revise 
statutory and structural provisions of their hybrid forms in 
order to make a stronger argument for favorable tax treatment. 
This conversation is especially salient in light of the recent 
federal trend toward minimizing the tax benefits awarded to 
nonprofit organizations.124 
  
 123 Given that Malani and Posner’s fourth point is merely that fraud law 
provides sufficient protection against imperfect consumers in the market to support 
businesses creating public goods, see supra Part II.D, it is unnecessary to provide 
analysis on this point.  
 124 Suzanne Perry, Limits on Charity Tax Breaks for Jobs Bill No Longer 
Likely, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Oct. 7, 2011), http://philanthropy.com/article/Limits-on-
Charity-Tax-Breaks/129325/.  
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A. The Low-Profit Limited Liability Company (L3C) 
1. Entity Structure 
The L3C is a variation of the traditional limited liability 
company125 and was initially developed for introduction in state 
legislatures as a vehicle to channel private foundation 
investments into for-profit businesses.126 The form contemplates 
a business that is, in the words of its creator Robert Lang, 
“going to be paying its own way in this world, but . . . may not 
make a lot of money.”127 Like the Limited Liability Company 
(LLC) that came before it, the hallmark of the L3C is its 
extreme flexibility.128 Consequently, as the form has developed, 
its sponsors have found that it may be used to accomplish goals 
beyond Lang’s original purpose.129 Perhaps most notably, 
scholars have suggested that L3Cs may theoretically take 
advantage of tranched investment structures that would 
appeal to market investors as well as private foundations.130 As 
the oldest of the American hybrid entities, variations of the 
  
 125 Robert Lang & Elizabeth Carrott Minnigh, The L3C, History, Basic 
Construct, and Legal Framework, 35 VT. L. REV. 15, 17 (2010). 
 126 Id. (“When I first conceived of the L3C, I had a more limited concept in 
mind than I have now. It was totally concentrated on finding a way to allow 
foundations to make investments into socially beneficial activities more efficiently and 
in partnership with commercial investment by creating a vehicle that would encourage 
foundations to do so.”). 
 127 Id. 
 128 Robert R. Keatinge, LLCs and Nonprofit Organizations—For-Profits, 
Nonprofits, and Hybrids, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 553, 582 (2009).  
 129 See, e.g., Dana Brakman Reiser, Governing and Financing Blended 
Enterprise, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 619, 628 (2010).  
 130 As Professor Brakman Reiser explains:  
An equity tranche of members could be tax-exempt private foundations making 
program-related investments. Because the PRI regulations specifically bar 
foundations from contemplating a financial return as a motive for investment, 
this tranche of members would be given scant or very remote rights to 
distributions. A mezzanine tranche of individuals or entities could purchase L3C 
memberships as a type of socially-responsible investment. This tranche of 
investors would agree to operating agreement terms that provided them with 
some access to distributions, but at a rate lower than market return, presumably 
doing so in return for the social or psychic value produced by the entity. The 
L3C’s operating agreement could then provide for a market-like return to a 
senior tranche of individuals and entities seeking such returns, presumably 
doing so in competition with other market-rate investment opportunities. The 
structure of these provisions might be more debt-like or equity-like (though if the 
latter, more like preferred than common stock), providing either a guaranteed 
return or a return keyed to the L3C’s profits. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
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L3C have been adopted in nine states and one Indian Territory, 
with 658 businesses operating as L3Cs.131  
Today, L3Cs do indeed blend aspects of traditionally 
profit-making organizations with historically public-oriented 
organizations. On the one hand, a typical statute authorizing 
the L3C132 resembles a nonprofit corporation. First, the L3C 
must be organized to further “the accomplishment of one or 
more charitable or educational purposes,”133 and second, “the 
production of income or the appreciation of property” cannot be 
a “significant purpose of the company.”134 On the other hand, 
and in some tension with the foregoing rule, L3C’s are permitted 
to “produce[] significant income or capital appreciation” if not a 
“significant purpose of the company.”135 Similarly, and perhaps 
more significantly, an L3C is not bound by the distribution 
constraint, and the statutes envision that the business will 
distribute profits to some or all of its members.136 Finally, “L3C 
status appears to be neither a permanent nor a publicly 
guarded designation,” which means that there is little to 
ensure that a business organized under the L3C label will 
enforce the dual mission it was founded to achieve.137 If the 
business changes course, it will simply lose its L3C designation 
and generally become an LLC.138 
In this discussion, the L3C is unique for its tax structure. 
As a subset of the LLC, the L3C is taxed as an LLC.139 As a 
result, its members may elect that the entity be taxed as a 
partnership or as a corporation. If taxed as a partnership, the 
L3C itself is not taxed at the organizational level.140 Rather, its 
earnings are taxed only after they are distributed and claimed 
as earnings by its members.141 If taxed as a corporation, then the 
  
 131 Latest L3C Tally, INTERSECTOR PARTNERS, http://www.intersectorl3c.com/ 
l3c_tally.html (last visited on Oct. 10, 2012). 
 132 This section will emphasize Vermont’s L3C statutory regime because it 
was the first of its kind and provides a useful benchmark. Other states’ L3C statutes 
are substantially similar. See, e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/1-26 (2011); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 450.4102 (2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-412 (2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-
102(a)(ix) (2011). 
 133 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(A) (2011). 
 134 Id. § 3001(27)(B).  
 135 Id. 
 136 Brakman Reiser, supra note 82, at 108-09. 
 137 Brakman Reiser, supra note 129, at 629. 
 138 See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(D). 
 139 See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 5920-5921 (2006). 
 140 LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON 
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 17:2 (West 2012). 
 141 Id.  
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L3C is subject to the typical for-profit corporate tax regime.142 An 
L3C may even elect to become a tax-exempt nonprofit 
organization, provided that it meets the statutory requirements 
of section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.143 
2. Tax Benefits Under the Traditional Theories 
The L3C illustrates that the nature of hybrid entities—
borrowing aspects from traditional for-profit and nonprofit 
organizations—creates both vices and virtues under traditional 
tax theory. Regarding its vices, the L3C is generally organized 
to produce earned income, some of which it will retain or 
distribute to members and owners.144 As discussed, generating 
profits is one of the two goals of a dual-mission organization, 
and L3Cs attempt to realize this goal by, among other tactics, 
touting the potential for tranched investments in L3C 
businesses. As such, taxing the entity does not violate 
traditional tax principles of taxing earned income and profits. 
Rather, it would be incongruous with traditional tax policy and 
would create horizontal inequities between L3Cs and typical 
LLCs if the IRS were to impose tax on the latter while creating 
favorable tax conditions for the former. Similarly, the L3C has 
an ability to pay taxes to the extent that it distributes its 
earnings to owners rather than to public constituents. Thus, 
the entity has income that appears fairly measurable, and it 
should have the resources necessary to pay its taxes. At first 
blush, it does not appear inappropriate to tax the L3C.  
As to its virtues, the L3C’s statutory provisions expressly 
require that businesses adopting the entity must be organized to 
accomplish one of the charitable purposes the IRS has outlined 
under section 501(c)(3).145 As such, an L3C business will 
necessarily operate to pursue one of the goals that the IRS has 
singled out for favorable treatment. This suggests that L3Cs will 
eliminate at least some need for services that the government 
might otherwise need to provide—the second traditional rationale 
for distinct tax treatment. But an L3C is not required to pursue 
these purposes exclusively, which creates some uncertainty about 
the level of government services an L3C business would replace. 
  
 142 Id. at § 17:22; see also supra Part II.A. 
 143 IRS, LLC GUIDE SHEET, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/ 
llc_guide_sheet.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2012). 
 144 See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(B) (2006). 
 145 See, e.g., id. § 3001(27)(A). 
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Regarding efficiency, L3Cs will almost surely have the potential 
to deliver their services more efficiently than the government—
and for the same reasons that nonprofits offer an efficient 
alternative. In particular, L3Cs operate within their communities 
and have a strong incentive to respond quickly to their 
constituencies’ needs. The L3C’s statutory prohibition against 
producing significant profits as a primary purpose of the business 
should help ensure that L3Cs remain committed to producing 
more and better goods or services for their constituents and that 
they seek additional income for their owners only as a secondary 
consideration.146 As such, the L3C does include some 
characteristics that support favorable tax treatment under the 
traditional tax theories. 
3. Tax Benefits Under Malani and Posner 
L3Cs have a stronger argument for tax incentives under 
Malani and Posner’s theory than under the traditional tax 
theories—but it is still insufficient to justify favorable tax 
treatment. Under the first and most important element of this 
theory, L3Cs will eliminate the need for some government 
services. The fact that an L3C’s purposes are statutorily 
constrained and must address one of the charitable purposes 
approved under section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code 
ensures that the primary activities of L3Cs will fully overlap 
with the primary activities of exempt nonprofits. Thus, the 
structure of the L3C directs these businesses to produce some 
form of the public goods and services that the government 
might otherwise have to provide. That L3Cs may also go on to 
pursue additional objectives—including the production of 
distributable income—is perfectly acceptable under Malani and 
Posner’s theory. Indeed, this theory does not require that a 
business pursue such public goods to the exclusion of all other 
activities. Relieving the government of some burden is 
sufficient to warrant favorable tax treatment under this theory. 
  
 146 See John Tyler, Negating the Legal Problem of Having “Two Masters”: A 
Framework for L3C Fiduciary Duties and Accountability, 35 VT. L. REV. 117, 141 
(2010). Tyler argues that the L3C structure is in fact sufficient to ensure that the 
profit-making motive is subordinate to the public purpose. Id. (“[A]t the highest levels, 
the theory and purposes of the L3C prioritize charitable, exempt purposes as a 
fiduciary matter. Moreover, characterizing the L3C as ‘for-profit’ does not refer to the 
firm’s objective, as is the case under normal circumstances for other forms, but instead 
most properly acknowledges legal permission to earn and distribute profits. . . . Given 
its purposes, it is probably more appropriate to refer to L3Cs as ‘for-charity’ . . . .”). 
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Under the theory’s second element, however, the L3C 
may create principal–agent problems that militate against 
favorable tax treatment. First, the statutory provision against 
making the production of profit a primary purpose will 
probably limit—but does not eliminate—the incentive for L3C 
managers to shirk on quality in favor of distributable profits. If 
the potential for substantial profits is sufficiently high and the 
L3C can earn them without alienating its constituencies—
namely, beneficiaries, employees, members, and creditors—then 
there would be little incentive not to pursue the profits. Second, 
the absence of a meaningful penalty on an L3C business or 
manager for deviating from its primary purpose only exacerbates 
the risk of entity departure.147 While an L3C may lose its 
designation, this outcome is probably of relatively little 
consequence to a business that has determined it can earn more 
significant profits without the designation. Third, L3Cs are 
organized under the laws governing LLCs and, consequently, 
their activities are not subject to the federal regulatory scrutiny 
that polices nonprofits.148 The IRS does not have authority to 
monitor whether the L3C complies with its state-law entity 
requirements. While state attorneys general have authority to 
review the conduct of businesses organized within the state,149 
L3Cs would presumably fall between the regulatory cracks, given 
that an L3C’s deviation from purpose would likely register as a 
low priority on the list of traditional business malfeasance that 
attorneys general prosecute.150 Moreover, the charities bureaus of 
the attorneys general are notoriously overburdened and 
underresourced, which suggests that they would not have the 
capacity to effectively regulate L3Cs’ adherence to statutory 
purposes—even if they had that authority.151 Finally, it is unclear 
precisely to what extent a regulator should enforce an L3C’s 
commitment to purpose. Businesses utilizing the L3C may value 
the statutory characteristics that appear to permit such a free 
transition between the L3C and LLC designations. Thus, L3Cs do 
  
 147 See Brakman Reiser, supra note 129, at 629. For a competing view, see 
Tyler, supra note 146, at 141. 
 148 Brakman Reiser, supra note 23, at 2463 (noting this issue in the context of 
a pure for-profit philanthropist); see also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(A). 
 149 See Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism and Paternalism in State 
Charity Law Enforcement, 79 IND. L.J. 937, 946 (2004). 
 150 Indeed, as Professor Brakman Reiser points out, Illinois is the only 
jurisdiction to treat “L3C managers . . . as charitable trustees” whose adherence to a 
business’s approved statutory purpose is monitored by the state attorney general. 
Brakman Reiser, supra note 25, at 616 n.132. 
 151 Brakman Reiser, supra note 23, at 2464; see also Brody, supra note 149, at 947. 
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not warrant favorable tax treatment under the second factor in 
Malani and Posner’s theory. 
L3Cs address the third aspect of Malani and Posner’s 
theory directly by providing public goods more efficiently than 
a nonprofit. First, the statutory language expressly permitting 
L3Cs to “[produce] significant income or capital appreciation” 
as long as it is not a “significant purpose of the company” is 
designed to allow a measure of pure profitability that is simply 
unavailable to nonprofits.152 This flexibility becomes especially 
important in light of the fact that L3Cs are permitted to 
distribute some portion of their earnings to owners.153 The 
combination of these two structural elements may lead to 
additional organizational efficiencies: as L3C managers seek to 
deliver their public goods in the most efficient way possible, they 
may generate more profits to distribute to owners, thereby 
achieving the dual-mission ideal. Moreover, an L3C may access 
traditional market tools for amassing capital—such as equity-
investment instruments unrelated to the L3C purpose—that are 
unavailable to nonprofits.154 Not only may the L3C invest its own 
funds in more ways than a nonprofit, but it may theoretically 
gain access to a larger market of investors who wish to see a 
return on investments—a return that nonprofits are prohibited 
from giving.155 While the size and strength of such a market is 
the subject of much debate, the L3C’s statutory structure 
nonetheless creates access to whatever market is available.156 
Consequently, L3Cs have efficiency benefits that nonprofits do 
not. Because providing an exclusive tax benefit to nonprofits 
ignores these benefits, L3Cs warrant favorable tax treatment 
under the last factor in Malani and Posner’s theory. 
4. Conclusions 
In light of this analysis, there are persuasive reasons to 
provide L3Cs favorable tax treatment. The L3C statutory 
structure ensures that businesses operating as L3Cs will offer 
some goods and services that the government would otherwise 
provide. Moreover, L3Cs have the potential to do so more 
efficiently than both the government and—at least in some 
  
 152 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(B); see also 26 C.F.R. § 1.513-1 (2012); 
Hansmann, supra note 74, at 838. 
 153 See Brakman Reiser, supra note 82, at 108-09. 
 154 I.R.C. § 513 (2006). 
 155 Id. 
 156 Brakman Reiser, supra note 82, at 108-09. 
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instances—nonprofits. But the L3C faces a significant hurdle in 
receiving favorable tax treatment since its lack of a strong 
regulatory framework creates the potential for principal–agent 
problems that could result in tax abuse. That is, without rigorous 
monitoring of a business’s commitment to purpose, L3Cs may take 
advantage of tax benefits designed to incentivize that purpose but 
ultimately elect to pursue pure profits rather than public benefits. 
Given the scarcity of resources available for mission enforcement, 
it is unlikely that the federal government or local governments 
will be able to take this step alone. Consequently, the L3C does 
not qualify for favorable tax treatment under either the traditional 
theories or Malani and Posner’s theory.  
B. The B Corporation 
1. Entity Structure 
By contrast to L3Cs, B Lab developed the B Corporation 
as an independent business mark that “us[es] the power of 
business to solve social and environmental problems.”157 B Lab, a 
nonprofit corporation, is committed to using the B Corporation 
to develop a community of businesses that aspire “to address 
society’s greatest challenges” by “harness[ing] the power of 
private enterprise to create public benefit.”158 B Lab envisions 
achieving this goal by requiring its businesses to meet “higher 
standards of transparency, accountability, and performance.”159 
Unlike L3Cs (and traditional business entities), B Corporations 
do not carry a legal distinction, and any business may apply to 
become a certified B Corporation, regardless of its entity.160 B 
Lab began certifying B Corporations in 2006,161 and more than 
600 businesses currently operate under its mark.162  
B Corporations blend traditional for-profit and nonprofit 
forms in two key ways. First, the B Corporation mark is open 
to all businesses, including all varieties of traditional for-profit 
  
 157 The Non-Profit Behind B Corps, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/what-
are-b-corps/the-non-profit-behind-b-corps (last visited Oct. 11, 2012). 
 158 Why B Corps Matter, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-
corps/why-b-corps-matter (last visited Oct. 15, 2012); The B Corp Declaration, B LAB, 
http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/the-b-corp-declaration (last visited Oct. 
15, 2012). 
 159 Why B Corps Matter, supra note 158. 
 160 Steven J. Haymore, Public(ly Oriented) Companies: B Corporations and the 
Delaware Stakeholder Provision Dilemma, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1311, 1313-14 (2011). 
 161 Brakman Reiser, supra note 25, at 594. 
 162 Founding B Corps, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/community/ 
founding-b-corps (last visited Oct. 15, 2012). 
650 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:2 
entities. But this freedom to embrace entities that support 
profit-making is tempered by purpose limitations that B Lab 
imposes through its certification process, which the company 
enforces with an auditing procedure. The certification process 
requires businesses to satisfy three requirements. The applicant 
must: (1) pass a scored impact assessment on its commitment to 
social good, (2) “amend[] its articles of incorporation and other 
governing documents” to “institutionalize its [social] commitment,” 
and (3) submit reporting documents and fees to B Lab, which 
audits the businesses.163 The impact assessment—which has been 
continuously revised—is developed by an independent Standards 
Advisory Council tasked with developing rigorous standards for 
social and environmental performance.164 Once a business passes 
the threshold score on the impact assessment, B Lab verifies its 
responses by reviewing documentation for a portion of the 
applicant’s responses.165 Then, B Lab conducts random annual 
audits of B Corporations to ensure that they comply with the 
required commitments.166 Currently, B Lab conducts audits on 20% 
of its membership every two years.167  
2. Tax Benefits Under the Traditional Theories 
Under the traditional theories, B Corporations face 
immediate obstacles to favorable tax treatment. First, B 
Corporations are not legally recognized entities and, 
consequently, the government may be skeptical of awarding 
favorable tax treatment merely by virtue of a business’s 
association with B Lab, regardless of how laudable its goals 
may be. That said, the absence of a legally recognized status is 
not fatal to B Corporations’ claim to favorable tax treatment, 
given that the government sometimes awards favorable tax 
  
 163 Haymore, supra note 160, at 1321. 
 164 B LAB, TERM SHEET FOR B CORPORATIONS, available at 
http://www.bcorporation.net/storage/documents/term_sheet_non-constituencybenefit.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 15, 2012). 
 165 How to Become a B Corp, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-
corp/how-to-become-a-b-corp (last visited Jan. 24, 2013). B Lab also helps businesses comply 
with the second requirement by providing basic step-by-step instructions on how to amend its 
governing documents; obtain approval of the amendments from the business’s governing body; 
obtain approval of the amendments from shareholders, members, or partners; and, where 
necessary, file its amended articles. Legal Roadmap, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/ 
become-a-b-corp/how-to-become-a-b-corp/1057-legal-roadmap (last visited Jan. 24, 2013).  
 166 Haymore, supra note 160, at 1321. 
 167 Brakman Reiser, supra note 25, at 602. 
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treatment based on a third-party designation.168 Second, typical 
for-profit businesses can be certified as B Corporations. When 
they are, these businesses would be able to pursue profit much 
as ordinary for-profits. As a result, it would be appropriate to 
tax that profit. Indeed, awarding favorable tax treatment only 
to B Corporations but not traditional for-profit corporations 
would create an acute horizontal equity concern. Moreover, for-
profit B Corporations have the ability to pay the income tax on 
their earnings, which avoids the liquidity problems that burden 
nonprofits. Third, and perhaps most problematically, B Lab 
certification does not ensure that B Corporations will provide 
public goods or services that the government would otherwise 
provide. To begin with, while B Lab’s impact assessment includes 
a purpose requirement, the parameters and even the necessity of 
this purpose requirement are not articulated with sufficient 
clarity or rigor.169 For instance, the impact assessment merely 
inquires as to whether a business’s “products or services are 
specifically designed to address an economic inequality, improve 
health, [or] promote the arts/sciences/media.”170 In addition to 
these permitted purposes, which bear some resemblance to the 
government-supported purposes under section 501(c)(3), B Lab 
also allows B Corporations to satisfy this requirement if they 
“drive capital to purpose-driven enterprises.”171 This allows 
businesses to qualify for the entity designation with an unusually 
broad list of activities.172 For example, as long as a business shows 
that it serves a high percentage of “poor or very poor” 
constituents,173 it may satisfy the purpose requirement by offering 
such services as “sustainability consulting,” making products 
that “promote healthy living,” or “[c]reat[ing] . . . empowerment 
opportunities.”174 Under B Lab’s broad purpose standards, a 
business that sells yoga mats to out-of-work actors could 
conceivably qualify as a B Corporation. Therefore, B 
Corporations cannot guarantee that they relieve the government 
of the need to provide public goods or services. In light of the 
  
 168 An example discussed at some length is LEED certification, infra at Part 
IV.B.3. See Eileen D. Millett, Green Building for Dummies: What Is a LEED 
Certification?, PRAC. REAL EST. LAW., Jan. 2009, at 41, 45. 
 169 Impact Assessment, SE1.1, B LAB, https://b-lab.secure.force.com/bcorp/ 
ImpactAssessment?id=a03C000000AYgPpIAL (last visited Oct. 15, 2012). 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. 
 172 See id. at SE3.1. 
 173 Id. at SE11.7. 
 174 Id. at SE3.1. 
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foregoing, B Corporations do not qualify for favorable tax 
treatment under the traditional tax theories. 
3. Tax Benefits Under Malani and Posner 
B Corporations face the same hurdle to favorable tax 
treatment under Malani and Posner’s first point as they do 
under the traditional tax theory. That is, B Corporations cannot 
demonstrate that they will provide a public good that the 
government would otherwise have to provide.175 Indeed, B Lab’s 
broad purpose requirements relate more to the company’s 
subjective and somewhat amorphous notion of positive 
community purpose rather than to an objective set of purposes 
that would relieve the government of its need to make costly 
social investments. Accordingly, B Corporations do not qualify 
for favorable tax treatment under Malani and Posner’s first 
consideration. 
Nevertheless, B Corporations make an important 
advance over L3Cs under the principal–agent point of Malani 
and Posner’s theory. Whereas L3Cs operate in a regulatory 
gray area—with no one to ensure that businesses adhere to the 
purpose requirements articulated under the statute—B 
Corporations are independently regulated by B Lab.176 B Lab’s 
commitment to initial certification and its responsibility for 
ongoing monitoring of all companies that bear its mark offer an 
intriguing solution to the difficulties of regulating potential tax 
advantages that would accrue to organizations based on entity 
type. Indeed, in a similar context, some scholars have argued 
that independent approaches to enforcing nonprofit law may be 
more successful than traditional lawmaking.177  
In theory, at least, B Lab plays much the same role for 
B Corporations that state attorneys general play for 
nonprofits—ensuring that an applicant business qualifies for 
the favorable mark, enforcing purpose requirements, and 
stripping a business of its privileged entity status and 
  
 175 See supra Part III.B.2. 
 176 Haymore, supra note 160, at 1321. 
 177 See, e.g., Garry W. Jenkins, Incorporation Choice, Uniformity, and the 
Reform of Nonprofit State Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 1113, 1115 (2007) (“This Article argues 
that because of the incorporation habits of nonprofit corporations, coupled with the 
limited governmental resources devoted to the development and enforcement of 
nonprofit state law, private lawmaking initiatives-independent from government 
control-provide the primary means for achieving uniformity and reform of nonprofit 
law. As a result, these private lawmaking projects have even more influence and 
importance than similar projects affecting other fields of law.”).  
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hypothetical tax advantages where it fails to meet its 
obligations. B Lab could relieve the federal government of 
much of its regulatory role without burdening state regulators, 
who are already overextended in their regulation of nonprofits. 
There may be some concern that B Lab’s audit lottery, which 
promises to audit only 10% of B Corporations annually, is 
inadequate to ensure that B Corporations do not deviate from 
their purpose after taking advantage of related tax benefits. This, 
however, is ten times the rate that the IRS currently audits 
taxpayers.178 As such, B Lab’s regulation of B Corporations has 
the potential to be more effective than the current federal 
regulation of nonprofits. B Lab’s system also compares favorably 
to other successful, independent regulatory systems such as 
Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) 
certification. As such, the government might look to LEED as a 
model for how to treat B Lab and B Corporations.179 
Finally, under the third factor of Malani and Posner’s 
theory, B Corporations cannot necessarily produce goods and 
services more efficiently than traditional nonprofits. Indeed, a 
B Corporation may be a traditional nonprofit that has merely 
grafted the B Corporation designation onto its business. In this 
sense, a B Corporation would not possess any efficiency 
advantage over traditional nonprofits but would already 
qualify for favorable tax treatment. Conversely, a B 
Corporation may be a traditional for-profit corporation that has 
a significant efficiency advantage but has committed only to 
loose social ideas rather than more objectively valuable social 
purposes. In this scenario, the efficiency gains become moot 
  
 178 Tax Cheater Warning: Odds Are Against You, SEATTLE TAX LAW. (Oct. 25, 
2011), http://www.seattletaxlawyers.org/index.php/tag/audit-lottery/. 
 179 LEED is a “nationally accepted third-party certification program” that 
rates and certifies building projects according to independently developed 
sustainability standards. Anika E. Leerssen, Smart Growth and Green Building: An 
Effective Partnership to Significantly Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 26 J. ENVTL. 
L. & LITIG. 287, 313 n.138 (2011). A building’s LEED certifications are, in turn, the 
qualifying criteria for favorable tax consequences. At this time, B Lab does not have the 
national recognition of LEED certification. But the organization appears intent on 
continuing to develop its certification systems and working with governments to ensure 
its viability. Passing Legislation, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-
corps/legislation (last visited Oct. 15, 2012). This commitment to work with governments 
augurs well for its potential to become a third party whose certification could trigger tax 
advantages. In addition, in both B Lab and LEED certification, companies must pay for 
the costs of certification and monitoring. Leerssen, supra, at 313 n.138. Consequently, 
governments need not incur the expense and businesses will only pursue the designation 
where it is strategically compelling, financially advantageous, or both. Furthermore, B 
Lab, like LEED, is a nonprofit organization, which should help to ensure that the expense 
of certification and monitoring is closely related to its cost. Id. 
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because the government would have little interest in 
encouraging efficiencies that do not redound to the public good 
and reduce government spending. As such, the B Corporation’s 
ambivalence to entity form is an impediment to granting 
favorable tax treatment based upon the entity designation. 
4. Conclusions 
The challenges that B Corporations face in receiving 
favorable tax treatment can be viewed as an inverse of the 
L3C. On the one hand, the B Corporation purpose requirements 
do not have the clarity or objective value of the L3C. L3C 
statutes have been tightly constructed and require businesses 
using the mark to serve the approved nonprofit purposes the 
IRS has outlined. By contrast, B Lab’s certification process 
utilizes a somewhat ponderous survey and approves an overly 
broad set of purposes that are largely subjective and bear little 
relation to purposes that the government encourages with 
favorable tax treatment. On the other hand, B Lab’s 
independent-certification and regulation model is a desirable 
alternative to the absence of any meaningful regulation of L3Cs. 
B Lab’s regulatory structure addresses significant principal–
agent concerns without burdening the government with 
administrative cost or complexity. With a successful working 
model like LEED certification to draw upon, a commitment to 
adopt successful regulatory practices, and its own funding 
stream, B Lab may be able to provide a successful system for 
policing B Corporations. But this regulatory advance will be of 
little use in securing tax advantages for B Corporations unless B 
Lab formulates a tighter set of purpose requirements and 
limits its designation to a defined entity type. Accordingly, at 
this stage in its development, the B Corporation does not 
qualify for favorable tax treatment under either the traditional 
theories or Malani and Posner’s theory. 
C. The Statutory Benefit Corporation 
1. Entity Structure 
B Lab’s creation has also begun to influence state 
legislatures, leading to the third hybrid entity option: the 
statutory benefit corporation. In 2010, Maryland established the 
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first statutory benefit corporation,180 which is closely “modeled on 
B Lab’s concept.”181 Since that time, Vermont, New Jersey, 
Virginia, Hawaii, California, and New York have all adopted their 
own versions of enabling legislation that allow businesses to 
become statutory benefit corporations.182 These benefit corporations 
are a “state-sanctioned” form that requires interested businesses to 
obtain “private certification” of commitments to social value that 
closely track the three original B Lab requirements.183 While the 
various state versions of the benefit corporation differ in some 
respects, they share a common core structure.184 As of this writing, 
there are few reliable statistics on how many businesses are 
operating as statutory benefit corporations.  
There are three key structural elements of statutory 
benefit corporations. First, each statute attempts to free 
businesses operating as benefit corporations from conflicts with 
shareholder primacy by incorporating language permitting the 
corporation to consider the interests of several constituencies 
without prioritizing shareholders.185 The statutes also expressly 
state that consideration of these other constituencies will not 
constitute a breach of fiduciary duty.186 Second, the statutes 
require that businesses applying for the designation serve one 
of several publicly oriented purposes.187 But the purpose 
requirements articulated in each of the statutes are more akin 
to the broad range of standards acceptable under the B 
Corporation’s certification process than to the narrower set of 
purposes approved by the IRS for nonprofit status. Acceptable 
purposes include:  
[(1)] Providing low-income or underserved individuals or communities 
with beneficial products or services; [(2)] Promoting economic 
  
 180 Maryland First State in Union to Pass Benefit Corporation Legislation, 
CSRWIRE (Apr. 14, 2010), http://www.csrwire.com/press_releases/29332-Maryland-
First-State-in-Union-to-Pass-Benefit-Corporation-Legislation. 
 181 Brakman Reiser, supra note 74, at 39; see also Brakman Reiser, supra note 
25, at 594. 
 182 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 1801-1832 (2012); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-38-110 
to -600 (2012); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-782 to -791 (2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21 
(2011); see also Judy Molland, Care2 Success! New York Establishes Benefit 
Corporations, CARE2 (Dec. 18, 2011, 3:00 PM), http://www.care2.com/causes/care2-
success-new-york-establishes-benefit-corporations.html. 
 183 Brakman Reiser, supra note 74, at 39; see also MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & 
ASS’NS § 5-6C-01 (2011). 
 184 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 1801-1832; S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-38-110 to 
-600; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-782 to -791; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21. 
 185 See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.09. 
 186 See, e.g., id. § 21.11. 
 187 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 1801-1832; S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-38-110 to 
-600; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-782 to -791; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21. 
656 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:2 
opportunity for individuals or communities beyond the creation of jobs 
in the normal course of business; [(3)] Preserving or improving the 
environment; [(4)] Improving human health; [(5)] Promoting the arts, 
sciences, or advancement of knowledge; [(6)] Increasing the flow of 
capital to entities with a public benefit purpose; and [(7)] Conferring 
any other particular benefit on society or the environment.188  
Third, the statutes require businesses to secure approval from 
a third party that has:  
a recognized standard for defining, reporting, and assessing corporate 
social and environmental performance that: [(1)] Is developed by a 
person that is independent of the benefit corporation; and [(2)] Is 
transparent because the following information about the standard is 
publicly available: [(a)] The factors considered when measuring the 
performance of a business; [(b)] The relative weightings of those factors; 
and [(c)] The identity of the persons that develop and control changes to 
the standard and the process by which those changes are made.189 
While none of the statutes state so explicitly, this provision 
appears to relate directly to B Lab’s lobbying efforts. In fact, the 
rise of the statutory benefit corporation in general is most likely 
the product of B Lab and its boosters, who have directed 
significant efforts toward passing each piece of enabling 
legislation.190 Consequently, benefit corporations in statutory form 
bear close resemblance to B Corporations. Finally, as the name 
might imply, statutory benefit corporations are corporations that 
must meet both the ordinary formation and operational 
requirements of for-profit corporations, with the exception of the 
variations described above.191 
2. Tax Benefits Under the Traditional Theories 
The traditional rationales that support favorable tax 
treatment for nonprofit corporations do not offer strong support 
for providing similar tax treatment to the statutory benefit 
corporation. First, taxing statutory benefit corporations is not 
fundamentally at odds with the goals of the tax system. As 
with both L3Cs and B Corporations, statutory benefit 
corporations contemplate earning some profit. It is appropriate 
to tax the corporations on those profits. Moreover, unlike L3Cs, 
  
 188 VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782; accord LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1803(A)(10); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 33-38-130(A)(7); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.03(a)(6). 
 189 VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782; accord LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1803(A)(12); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 33-38-130(A)(9); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.03(a)(8).  
 190 Passing Legislation, supra note 179. 
 191 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1802(C); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38-130(B); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-784; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.02(a). 
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statutory benefit corporations are not restricted to earning only a 
marginal level of profits. Rather, they may pursue significant 
profits as long as they also maintain their commitment to the 
broad purposes outlined by statute. Accordingly, statutory 
benefit corporations should be able to pay income taxes imposed 
on their earnings. Unlike B Corporations, statutory benefit 
corporations are legally recognized entities that individual states 
have sanctioned. But this characteristic is not alone sufficient to 
warrant favorable tax treatment under the traditional theory. 
Second, it is unclear to what extent statutory benefit 
corporations will provide goods and services that the 
government would otherwise need to provide. While the 
purpose requirements articulate some goals that closely track 
the IRS’s approved purposes for nonprofit exemption, the 
statutes go on to broaden the scope of permissible purposes by 
including “[c]onferring any other particular benefit on society 
or the environment” as an acceptable purpose.192 This catchall 
purpose mirrors the expansive purposes that B Lab approves; 
it does little to ensure that businesses operating as statutory 
benefit corporations will pursue one of the narrow classes of 
activities that the government wishes to encourage with 
favorable tax treatment. In this regard, the enabling legislation 
is well drafted to funnel statutory benefit corporations into the 
B Lab fold, but it is poorly designed to justify favorable tax 
treatment on the basis of the entity. 
3. Tax Benefits Under Malani and Posner 
As discussed above, the enabling statutes fail to 
effectively ensure that statutory benefit corporations will 
produce goods and services that the government might 
otherwise need to provide. Considering the statutory language 
more deeply will help to illustrate this point. To begin with, 
even those statutory-benefit-corporation purposes that track 
the accepted IRS purposes tend to expand the acceptable range 
of activity beyond what the government generally encourages 
with favorable tax treatment. For instance, “Promoting the 
arts, sciences, or advancement of knowledge” parallels the 
government’s accepted scientific, educational, and literary 
purposes. But the expanded statutory purpose includes the 
vague “advancement of knowledge” term, which broadens the 
  
 192 VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782; see also, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 1801-1832; S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 33-38-130(A)(7)(g); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.02(a); I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2011). 
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scope of the purpose beyond what might ensure the provision of 
services the government would otherwise have to provide.193 
Similarly, the purpose of “[p]roviding low-income or underserved 
individuals or communities with beneficial products or services” 
tracks the accepted IRS charitable purpose but includes the 
overly broad term “beneficial products or services,” which is too 
vague and overinclusive to meet Malani and Posner’s first 
consideration.194 The remaining list of approved statutory-benefit-
corporation purposes reflects broad social and environmental 
ideals that the government does not systemically encourage with 
favorable tax benefits.195 Consequently, the statutory benefit 
corporation does not warrant favorable tax treatment under 
Malani and Posner’s first consideration. 
In an attempt to address Malani and Posner’s second 
concern, the statutory benefit corporation, like the B 
Corporation, attempts to address principal–agent problems by 
formally assigning regulatory responsibilities to independent 
third parties. As discussed above, this system has the potential 
to provide an efficient regulatory regime by significantly 
reducing government’s role in regulation, causing businesses to 
internalize most certification and monitoring costs, and assuring 
that statutory benefit corporations adhere to a set of approved 
purposes. Given B Lab’s desire to serve as a major third-party 
regulator, its growing capacity, and its work with state 
legislatures, it is possible that B Lab will be able to effectively 
perform this regulatory function. But it is likely that other third-
party standard setters may enter the market to certify and 
monitor statutory benefit corporations, as well. Given the 
relative ease with which companies can meet the statutory 
requirements and become third-party regulators, it is by no 
means certain that every regulator will adequately fulfill its 
role and effectively monitor statutory benefit corporations.196 To 
  
 193 VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782; see, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1803(A)(10)(e); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38-130(A)(7)(e); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.03(6)(E); see also 
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
 194 VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782; see, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1803(A)(10)(a); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38-130(A)(7)(a); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.03(6)(A); see also 
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
 195 To reiterate, these include “[p]romoting economic opportunity for 
individuals or communities beyond the creation of jobs in the normal course of 
business; . . . [p]reserving or improving the environment; . . . [i]mproving human 
health; . . . [i]ncreasing the flow of capital to entities with a public benefit purpose; 
and . . . [c]onferring any other particular benefit on society or the environment.” VA. 
CODE ANN. § 13.1-782; accord LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1803(A)(10); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-
38-130(A)(7); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.03(6). 
 196 See Brakman Reiser, supra note 25, at 601. 
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the extent that third parties fall short in their regulatory role, 
there is a risk that their certifications will create a public 
impression that businesses meet an objective set of favorable 
criteria without ensuring that they actually do—leading to the 
very principal–agent problems that the nonprofit designation 
and IRS enforcement do much to avoid.  
Although hardly dispositive as to whether statutory 
benefit corporations should qualify for favorable tax treatment 
under Malani and Posner’s theory, these corporations are likely 
to produce public goods and services more efficiently than 
nonprofits. As with both the L3C and B Corporations, statutory 
benefit corporations have access to streams of capital that are not 
available to nonprofits. This theoretically allows businesses 
operating under this entity to make the most efficient use of 
market resources when pursuing their purposes. Furthermore, 
statutory benefit corporations’ ability to distribute some earnings 
to owners creates a strong incentive to maximize organizational 
efficiency in order to increase income for shareholders. As with 
L3Cs, these efficiency gains may be tempered by the requirement 
that statutory benefit corporations adhere to the purpose 
requirements as set forth by statute and monitored by third-
party regulators. That said, this potential drag on efficiency is 
not sufficient to militate against favorable tax treatment under 
the third consideration of Malani and Posner’s theory. 
4. Conclusions 
As with both the L3C and B Corporation, the statutory 
benefit corporation makes an incomplete argument for favorable 
tax treatment. Under the traditional theory, the entity does not 
warrant tax advantages because businesses operating under the 
designation will produce some profit and may not eliminate the 
need for government services. Under Malani and Posner’s 
theory, the statutory benefit corporation warrants tax 
advantages because of its potential to produce goods and 
services more efficiently than traditional nonprofits and its 
independent regulatory solution to potential principal–agent 
problems. As with B Corporations, however, the enabling 
legislation creates an overly broad set of purposes, which allows 
statutory benefit corporations to pursue a range of activities far 
beyond those that would limit the need for government services. 
Consequently, this entity lacks the essential ingredient necessary 
for the government to encourage its activities with favorable tax 
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treatment—and the essential ingredient for support under 
Malani and Posner’s theory.  
CONCLUSION 
As hybrid entities begin to erode the hard-edged 
divisions between for-profit and nonprofit entity types, it is 
instructive to consider how they might similarly blur traditional 
notions of for-profit and nonprofit taxation. The foregoing note is 
an attempt to develop this discussion by applying three tax 
theories to existing hybrid entities: two traditional theories that 
support nonprofit tax exemption, and Malani and Posner’s more 
recent theory that argues for a broader system of tax advantages 
for businesses producing social benefits. Under the traditional 
theories of favorable tax treatment for nonprofits—which share 
the hybrid entities’ goal to produce socially valuable goods and 
services—the hybrid entities’ profit production and distribution 
imposes a serious challenge to favorable tax treatment. Under 
Malani and Posner’s theory, the hybrid entities make a 
stronger—albeit unsuccessful—case for favorable tax treatment. 
L3Cs lack the regulatory structures to enforce their socially 
valuable purposes. B Corporations and statutory benefit 
corporations fail to outline a sufficiently rigorous set of business 
purposes to ensure that they would relieve the government of 
services it would otherwise need to perform. Accordingly, none of 
the hybrid entities currently warrant favorable tax treatment. 
Moving forward, social entrepreneurs and legislators 
engaged in the discussion on hybrid entities would be well 
advised to consider synthesizing elements of each hybrid entity 
in order to present a stronger argument for favorable tax 
treatment. Combining the L3C’s narrow set of approved 
purposes, the B Corporation’s independent regulatory 
framework, and the statutory benefit corporation’s form would 
produce an entity that could limit the need for government 
services, reduce principal–agent concerns, and produce goods 
and services more efficiently than traditional nonprofits. Such 
an entity would represent a valuable addition to the spectrum of 
hybrid entities and would make a strong case for tax 
advantages. Until this occurs, businesses like Seventh 
Generation should continue to test traditional tax boundaries  
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and push tax law to keep pace with today’s new generation of 
hybrid businesses and entities. 
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